Abstract: International spillovers and exchange rate dynamics are examined in a two-country dynamic optimizing model that allows for idiosyncratic tastes across countries. Specifically, there is a home-good bias in consumption patterns: at given relative prices the ratio of home goods consumed to foreign goods consumed is higher in the home country. The setup nests Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) , who assume identical tastes. Allowing for idiosyncratic tastes produces results that differ from Obstfeld and Rogoff's: expansionary monetary policy increases home utility by more, the positive spillovers of a fiscal expansion are reduced, and both short-run and long-run deviations from consumption-based purchasing power parity (PPP) are possible. The model's predictions are broadly consistent with those from the Frenkel, Razin and Yuen (1996) version of the two-country Mundell-Fleming model and with observed behavior of real and nominal exchange rates.
1 There is vast empirical evidence that deviations from PPP exist and that convergence to PPP is a slow process (See, for example, the review of Froot and Rogoff, 1995) .
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I. Introduction
Open-economy macroeconomics has long relied on the workhorse Mundell-Fleming (MF) model to analyze the impacts of monetary and fiscal policies. More recently, the development of openeconomy models with optimizing agents has cast doubt on the robustness of the MF model without providing a tractable alternative for policy analysis that broadly replicates the basic MF results. A key component of the MF model is the assumption of sticky prices. Obstfeld and Rogoff (OR) in their path-breaking 1995 article introduce sticky prices into an optimizing open-economy model, but the results they obtain do not resemble those of Mundell (1963 Mundell ( , 1968 and Fleming (1962) . This paper takes a significant step towards reconciling the optimizing framework with the policy conclusions of Mundell and Fleming by allowing for idiosyncratic tastes and thereby incorporating the standard presumption of a 'home bias' in consumption. If it can be shown that a simple optimizing model replicates many of the results of the MF model, and provides plausible explanations when the results differ, then in the near future optimizing-agent models may indeed become a more important part of the practitioners toolkit. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) construct a two-country dynamic optimizing model with imperfect competition and sticky prices in which individuals have identical preferences for all goods in the world. Casual observation suggests, however, that consumption is highly skewed towards domestic goods. Before the relatively recent movement towards models with explicit micro foundations, consumption home bias was represented by a marginal propensity to import that was smaller than the marginal propensity to spend on domestic goods. In the optimizing-agent model developed in this paper, the degree of home bias depends on a parameter in an individual's utility function: as home bias increases, individuals obtain increasingly more utility from domestic goods.
In this paper it is shown that the imposition of identical tastes has strong implications for the results in the model. Some of the implications are obvious: with identical tastes, consumption baskets are identical across countries and thus it is not surprising that both relative and absolute consumptionbased PPP hold at all times. Other implications are more subtle. For example, with identical preferences and zero initial net foreign assets, a domestic monetary expansion increases utility equally throughout the world. Moreover, the assumption of identical preferences severely limits the real world applicability of optimizing-agent models: insights can be obtained into the cross-country effects of economic policies of countries for whom trade is a large share of GDP, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, but not for relatively closed countries such as the U.S., the European Union as a whole, and Japan.
Allowing for home bias has strong implications for exchange rate determination and makes my model consistent with some of the observed behavior of exchange rates. Not surprisingly, with sticky prices and different consumption baskets across countries, short-term deviations from relative PPP are possible. However, it has been observed that deviations from PPP are remarkably persistent, more so than can be explained by sticky prices.
1 Krugman (1990) offers an explanation:
3 The model is similar to others that have been developed simultaneously. It is most similar to Ghironi (1998) , who also allows for idiosyncratic tastes across continents in a U.S.-Europe model and allows governments to balance their budgets intertemporally instead of period-by-period, but imposes logarithmic preferences for real balances. Corsetti and Pesenti (1998) , by separating the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods from the degree of monopolistic competition, are able to get closed-form solutions for a version of OR with logarithmic preferences for real balances, although in doing so assume a two-good world with identical tastes, consumption-based PPP, and unitary elasticity of substitution. These assumptions play prominent roles in Corsetti and Pesenti's results: their two-country model allows for current account imbalances that never occur. Tille (1998) gets around the uncomfortable assumption of PPP by using a pricing-to-market model in which the law of one price does not hold. 4 The money-in-the-utility function approach can be rationalized by arguing that real money balances allow agents to save time in conducting transactions.
-3-The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the dynamic optimizing model, which completely nests OR, is developed. The supply side of the model is based on the static closed-economy models of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Ball and Romer (1989) . The demand side derives from a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type consumption index. Analytical solutions, obtained by log-linearizing around an initial steady state, are discussed in Section III for monetary, fiscal, and productivity shocks. Section IV compares the up-to-date model developed here to a relatively standard twocountry MF model. Section V concludes. Tastes   3 In Section II.A, the structural model is developed. In Section II.B, the equations that govern the long-run, flexible price steady state changes are presented, under the assumption that the countries are mirror images. The short-run, sticky price deviations from the initial steady state are discussed in Section II.C.
II. An Optimizing Model with Idiosyncratic

II.A The Structural Model and Initial Steady State
The world is inhabited by a continuum of producer/consumers each producing a single differentiated product. Prices are sticky, which, in this model with imperfect competition, may be motivated by a 'menu costs' argument as in Mankiw (1985) . World population is normalized to one and individuals producer/consumers are indexed by z 0 [0,1], with the fractions n and 1-n residing in Home and Foreign, respectively. There is no uncertainty except for one-time unanticipated shocks that are either temporary or permanent. Individuals in both countries can freely borrow and lend on an integrated world capital market. Production is not explicitly modeled and there is no physical capital nor investment. For simplicity, it is assumed that output is equal to labor input.
The problem of a typical Home resident z is presented in Table 1 . She chooses paths for consumption, C; money and bond holdings, M and B; and effort or output, y(z), to maximize a time separable utility function with unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution given by (T1.1). 4 It is assumed and ,>0. In each period t a Home resident faces a budget constraint given by 0 < < 1 5 International lending is done through a real world bond denominated in the Home consumption index, the stocks of which held by Home and Foreign residents entering period t+1 is B t and B t *, respectively. The real interest rate, r t , is defined as the interest rate earned between t and t+1. The zero net bond condition imposes .
The price index may be interpreted as the cost of one unit of consumption and is given by
See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , pages 222-228, for a complete description of price indices.
-4-equation (T1.2), which takes into account costless international lending and borrowing.
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Governments finance spending by taxes and seignorage, and must balance their budgets in every period; the Home government's budget constraint is given by equation (T1.3). Individuals' budget constraints are immediately affected by changes in government policy: if the money supply is not increased, increases in government spending are matched by increases in lump-sum taxes, T, and increases in the money supply with no change in government spending result in lump-sum transfer payments. A Home producer, z, takes as given world demand for her product, defined as a population weighted average of Home and Foreign private and public demands, given by equation (T1.4). 
In Table 2 , which shows the consumption index and demand functions for Home and Foreign goods, p(z) and p * (z) are prices of a good z 0 [0,n] produced in Home and a good z 0 (n,1] produced in Foreign, respectively; E is the Home currency price of Foreign currency; P is the consumption-based price index; and the law of one price is assumed to hold.
6 Idiosyncratic tastes are introduced through a parameter in the consumption index, equation (T2.1), which is a modification of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) constant elasticity of substitution form. Specifically, there is a home-good bias in consumption patterns if at given relative prices the ratio of Home goods consumed to Foreign goods consumed is higher in Home. A Home consumer's demand functions for Home and Foreign goods, equations (T2.2) and (T2.3), derived by minimizing the cost of one unit of composite consumption 7 The Home government's demand for a good z produced by a Home resident is given by
It is reasonable to allow governments to have higher home biases than private individuals. However, this would require another consumption-based price index, which would likely complicate the model more than is justified.
-5-taking product prices as given, is shown to depend on the home bias parameter, " (" 0 (0,2)), and relative prices. The intratemporal substitution elasticity between Home and Foreign goods, 2, is also the price elasticity of demand faced by each producer, and is assumed to be greater than one to ensure that marginal revenue is positive. Real Home government consumption spending, G, is derived analogously to private Home consumption spending, and governments are assumed to have the same bias parameter as consumers. 7 Table 2 . A Home Consumer's Consumption Index Home bias is shown graphically in Figure 1 , which depicts the effect of home bias on a consumer's choice between domestic and imported goods and is drawn for unitary relative prices. Utility curve u A and income-consumption path OA represents the Obstfeld-Rogoff case in which consumers have identical preferences for all goods regardless of origin: with unitary relative prices, consumers demand equal amounts of domestic and imported goods. Consumer's with a home bias (" = 1.6 in this case) have utility curve u B and income-consumption path OB; with unitary relative prices their relative demand for domestic goods is "/(2-"), or four.
In the policy experiments conducted in this paper, one-time unanticipated shocks to the money supply, government spending, or productivity push the economy off its steady state path. The shocks 8 The Home nominal interest rate and UIP condition in this perfect foresight model are given by and .
-6-are level shifts that occur in period 1 and are temporary (lasting one period) or permanent. With the assumption that product prices adjust in the second period -that is, they are constant for one period only -the economy reaches a new steady state path in the second period, and two periods are sufficient to capture the dynamics of the model. As in OR, all producers in a country are symmetric and will therefore choose the same price and output in equilibrium, thus we can speak of the price, p, and output, y, of the typical Home good.
The first-order conditions from a typical Home individual's dynamic maximization problem are given in Table 3 . Equation (T3.1) is the standard first-order consumption Euler equation for unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The consumption-based money demand equation, (T3.2), equates the marginal utility of real balances to the opportunity cost in terms of consumption, and reflects the fact that at the margin in period t individuals must be indifferent between consuming one unit of C and using the same funds to raise cash balances. Equation (T3.3) is the labor-leisure tradeoff: the marginal utility of the additional revenue earned from producing an extra unit of the Home good must equal the marginal disutility of the needed effort. By the definition of the Home nominal interest rate and its Foreign counterpart, uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds.
8 Table 3 : First-Order Conditions
Steady-state solutions are presented in Table 4 . In solving for the steady state it is assumed that all exogenous variables are constant. This, in turn, implies a constant steady-state consumption level, which, by the consumption Euler, equation (T3.1), implies a constant steady state real interest rate, given by equation (T4.1). In the steady state the intertemporal budget constraints are given by equations (T4.2) and (T4.2*). 
Note the assumptions imply that and .
Assumptions used to get an initial steady state with a closed-form solution are also listed in Table  4 . Specifically, it is assumed that net foreign assets and government spending are zero, and countries are mirror images (i.e., have equal sizes and equal bias parameters). 9 The mirror image assumption has as a special case identical preferences but in general allows for home bias. To analyze the effects of policy changes and productivity shocks on Home and Foreign variables, the model is linearized around the initial steady state. This is done, as in OR, by expressing the model in terms of deviations from the baseline steady state path. In this model nominal rigidities are in the form of constant product prices for the first period of a shock, t. Thereafter, in periods t+1 and beyond, product prices fully adjust and a new steady state is reached.
There are two types of deviations from the initial steady state. Long-run deviations are those consistent with flexible product prices and are changes from the initial to a new steady state. These long-run steady-state changes are denoted by tildes; for any variable X, , where is X /d X /X 0X0 the initial steady-state value. In the short run, product prices are fixed and the economies are not on a steady-state path. Short-run deviations from the initial steady state are denoted by hats; thus, for any variable X, , where t is the period of the shock. X / dX t /X 0 The model will be solved for cross-country differences under the mirror image assumption of equal country sizes and bias parameters. For ease of exposition, the discussions will focus on the case with " $ 1; many results change significantly if all individuals favor imported goods. As noted, the OR 10 In equation (T5.1), the long-run changes in the CPI-based real exchange rate, Q, and terms of trade, t, are given by:
where small p and p* are product prices of typical Home and Foreign goods, and large P and P* are CPIs. As defined an increase in Q is a real depreciation for the Home currency, and an increase in t is an improvement in the Home terms of trade .
-8-model with identical preferences is replicated by the limiting case of " = "* = 1.
II.B Long-Run Steady-State Changes
Long-run equations are presented in Table 5 . Log-linearizing the CPIs around the initial steady state gives equation (T5.1), which clearly shows that if preferences are identical, the real exchange rate is constant and PPP holds regardless of the nature of shocks.
10 Note too that equation (T5.1) implies that the terms of trade should be more volatile than the real exchange rate in the long run. 
The log-linearized versions of (T1.4) and its foreign counterpart, interpreted as world demand schedules for typical home and foreign products, give equation (T5.2), the long-run change in relative demand. From equation (T5.2) it is clear how the bias parameter, ", affects relative demand. If tastes are identical across countries ("=1), demand differences are affected by only the terms of trade: as Home products become expensive relative to Foreign ones, demand switches from Home to Foreign. If countries prefer domestic goods, however, spending differentials % both private and public % matter, to a degree that depends on ". Moreover, the terms of trade influences demand less as " increases: if citizens have an inherent preference for domestic goods, relative prices matter somewhat less. Equation (T3.3) and its foreign counterpart, which describe the optimal flexible-price output levels, 11 Recall that 6 is the marginal disutility of effort; an increase in 6 can therefore be interpreted as a decrease in productivity.
12 World private and public consumption demand at time t is given by
A population-weighted average of Home and Foreign intertemporal budget constraints (substituting in government budget constraints) yields the global goods market equilibrium condition:
give the long-run relative supply equation (T5.3), which shows that long-run supply differentials are affected by differences in productivity and consumption as well as, in contrast to OR, changes in the terms of trade. A permanent increase in the relative marginal disutility of effort reduces Home relative supply, as expected.
11 An increase in relative consumption allows Home individuals to enjoy relatively more leisure, thus relative supply falls. An improvement in Home terms of trade reduces relative supply if ">1.
Long-run cross-country consumption differentials, equation (T5.4), are obtained by linearizing the intertemporal budget constraints, (T1.2) and its foreign counterpart, around the initial steady state. The effect of changes in the terms of trade on consumption differentials is maximized when "=1: relative income changes matter most when imported goods carry heavy weights in the consumption basket. Equation (T5.5), obtained by linearizing the consumption Eulers, provides a link between the short and long runs, and shows that consumption differentials are permanent for any shock.
The linearized long-run global goods market equilibrium condition is given by equation (T5.6).
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Across steady states inflation and the real interest rate do not change, so long-run linearized versions of the money demand equation (T3.2) and its foreign counterpart yield equation (T5.7).
II.C. Short-Run Deviations from the Initial Steady State
In the short run nominal product prices, p and p * , are fixed. With preset prices, the equation equating marginal revenue and marginal cost, (T3.3), need not hold; short-run output is determined entirely by demand. Short-run deviations from the initial steady state are presented in Table 6 . Table 6 : Short-Run Equations
To see that this model predicts that with home bias the nominal exchange rate is more volatile than relative prices, note that (T6.1) implies that . If = 1.8, nominal exchange rate changes are fivê P &P ( ' ( 2 & )Ê times greater than changes in relative prices. MacDonald (1988) provides empirical evidence of this.
14 The levels and linearized (with ) short-run Home current account surplus are B 0 ' 0 and .
This is the amount lent to Foreign in the short run, which is repaid with interest in the long run when current accounts are required to be balanced.
The change in net foreign assets in the above equation is a long-run steady-state change because in the special case of an initial steady state with zero net foreign assets, the short-run and long-run changes in the net foreign asset position are identical.
15 Equation (T6.4) is obtained by log-linearizing the money demand equation (T3.2) and its foreign counterpart, noting that all (t+1) subscripts are steady state changes (tildes) and all t subscripts are short-run changes (hats).
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Equation (T6.1), the short-run change in the real exchange rate, shows that in this model as home bias increases, the correlation between real and nominal exchange rates increases and nominal exchange rates become much more volatile than price indices. 13 Moreover, only with home bias does the nominal exchange rate deviate from its PPP-level in the short run.
Short-run output differentials are given by equation (T6.2). As in the long-run, private and public spending differentials affect output differentials only if preferences are idiosyncratic: with home bias more spending stays at home and spending differentials matter. Note, too, that the demand switching effect of nominal exchange rate changes is maximized when "=1 and decreases as " increases.
Equations for Home and Foreign current accounts yield equation (T6.3) for short-run changes in consumption differentials.
14 By lending in the short run, Home individuals must forego some consumption. An exchange rate depreciation tends to lower Home relative income and thus relative consumption. Equation (T6.3) also shows that the partial effect of a tax-financed one-unit increase in Home relative government spending is to decrease Home relative consumption by one-unit. Note, however, that the crowding out is not quite so severe, especially if there is home bias: from equation (T6.2) an increase in relative government spending also increases relative output, which in turn has a positive effect on relative consumption.
The relative money demand equation, (T6.4), depends on relative consumption, a prediction common to many intertemporal monetary models.
15
In this model consumption is roughly equivalent to disposable income.
III. The Dynamic Responses to Policy and Productivity Shocks
Long-run semi-reduced form equations that hold for all types of shocks are discussed in Section III.A. The effects of monetary, fiscal, and productivity shocks are separately investigated in Sections III.B, III.C and III.D, respectively. Since the effects of shocks are additive, nothing is lost with this approach. All equations and solutions were verified numerically in GAUSS for various parameter values. Table 7 contains long-run semi-reduced form equations that hold for any shock. Table 7 : Long-Run Semi-Reduced Forms
III.A. Long-Run Semi-Reduced Form Equations
Equations (T5.1) -(T5.7) can be used to examine the effects of net foreign assets, fiscal policies and productivity shocks on relative consumption (T7.1), relative output (T7.2) and the terms of trade (T7.3). Although care must be taken when interpreting these partial relationships, some intuition can be gleaned from them. Equation (T7.1) shows that a wealth transfer increases relative consumption, but by less than the change in relative net foreign asset positions: Home individuals take advantage of the increased wealth to both increase consumption and reduce their work effort. Not surprisingly, an increase in relative tax-financed government spending decreases relative consumption (since 2>2"-3), although the decrease is smaller as home bias increases and more of the government spending stays in the domestic economy. Equation (T7.2) shows that a balancedbudget increase in relative government spending increases relative output if " > 1, and, as in Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) , the impact increases as producers' market power increases (i.e., as 2 decreases). In conjunction with equation (T7.1), it also shows that an increase in relative government spending % and lump-sum taxes % decreases relative consumption and increases relative output as Home individuals work more. A permanent decrease in relative productivity decreases long-run relative output: as the marginal disutility of effort increases, individuals work less and output falls. From equation (T7.3), an increase in Home relative consumption, caused perhaps by a wealth transfer, enables Home individuals to work less and increases the long-run relative price of Home products (the terms of trade). Relative government spending affects the long-run terms of trade only if there is home bias: when preferences are identical government spending falls equally on all goods in the world and therefore has no effect on relative prices.
III.B. A Permanent Increase in Home Relative Money Supply
Any relative money shock affects the distribution of world consumption and output in both the short 16 In the case of a pure monetary shock, long-run changes in world consumption and output are proportional, which can be seen by summing the following long-run semi-reduced forms for output:
17 For a pure money shock, the semi-reduced forms for long-run consumption are
Summing these gives ; monetary policy does not affect long-run world consumption. Summing thẽ C %C ( ' 0 consumption Eulers thus shows that short-run world consumption is affected by monetary policy only if the real interest rate changes:
Short-run money demand equations can be written as
Summing these and using the above equations gives the semi-reduced form for the short-run real interest rate:
which, as claimed, changes only if world money supply changes or preferences are not identical.
-12-run (due to fixed product prices) and the long run (due to current account transfers). However, a pure monetary shock is world neutral in the long run for any degree of home bias in that it affects the composition, but not the level, of long-run world consumption and output. 16 If the shock is a change in the composition, but not the level, of the world money supply, there is also no world real effect in the short run if preferences are identical. With home bias, even a change in the composition of world money supply affects the short-run real interest rate and the levels of world consumption and output.
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The short-run effects of permanent change in relative money supply (
nominal exchange rate and relative consumption are shown graphically in Figure 2 . The MM curve, which graphs equation (T8.1) and is obtained using equations (T5.7) and (T6.4), shows how relative consumption changes, through their effect on relative money demand, affect the exchange rate. As " increases the MM curve becomes steeper and shifts more for a given change monetary policy. The GG curve, which graphs equation (T8.2) and is obtained using equations (T6.2), (T6.3), and (T7.1), shows the currency depreciation % and therefore the increase in relative output % needed to justify an increase in relative consumption. It, too, steepens as " increases. 
Productivity Shocks
The initial equilibrium in Figure 2 is at the origin: without a policy shock the exchange rate and consumption differential are constant. The vertical intercept of the MM curve is the amount of the permanent increase in the relative money supply, , if preferences are identical, and is greater M &M ( than when there is home bias. Thus, Figure 2 shows that in this model nominal exchangẽ M &M ( rate changes can exceed changes in relative money supplies only if home bias exists.
Home bias also results in exchange rate overshooting in the Dornbush (1976) sense. From the MM curve and equation (T5.7), without home bias the exchange rate jumps immediately to its long-run level. With home bias, the exchange rate overshoots in the short run and appreciates during the adjustment to the long run.
The MM and GG curves, along with the equations (T5.1) and (T6.7) for the long-run and short-run changes in the real exchange rate, give us enough information to solve the model in terms of country differences. Solutions, along with the signs of partial derivatives with respect to the various parameters, are presented in Appendix A.
When preferences are identical a permanent Home relative money supply shock depreciates the Home currency in the short-run (A.1) as the exchange rate jumps immediately to its long-run level, which in this case is also the PPP-level. With sticky product prices the depreciation translates directly into a fall in the relative price of Home goods, thus demand shifts towards Home goods and Home relative output increases (A.7). With the increase in the relative money supply, Home relative consumption increases as well (A.9). Home residents save part of the increase in relative real 18 For a pure money shock, the short-run increase in relative domestic real income is given by:
Since demand is elastic ( >1), if $1 a decrease in relative price results in an increase in relative revenue.
-14-income by running a current-account surplus (A.6) to smooth consumption.
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The increased wealth from the current account surplus plays an important role in the long run. In the case of a pure monetary shock, long-run output differentials are, from equations (T7.1) and (T7.2), equal in magnitude to the wealth transfer. Wealthier Home residents are able to work less (A.8) while maintaining their permanent level of consumption. The long-run fall in Home relative output and increase in Home relative consumption results in an increase in Home relative product price; that is, Home's terms of trade improves permanently.
The degree of home bias significantly affects the impact of monetary policy. With home bias, a permanent money shock causes the short-run exchange rate to overshoot its long-run level, which no longer corresponds to PPP. Moreover, the amount of overshooting and long-run deviation from PPP increases with the degree of home bias. The higher the degree of home bias, the larger are the real exchange rate's short-run depreciation and long-run appreciation. Moreover, the long-run improvement in the terms of trade increases with " as well: although relative Home consumption and relative Foreign output are not increasing with home bias, their effects on the long-run terms of trade are, as can be seen from equation (T7.3). Home bias has a nonlinear effect on current accounts and relative consumption: at low levels of home bias, wealth transfers and relative consumption increase with ", but as " increases the effect becomes negative.
Welfare Effects of Monetary Policy
The effects of expansionary monetary policy on utility differs among two-country optimizing-agent models. A rather surprising result from OR is that expansionary monetary policy increases utility by the same amount in both countries, independent of which country actually inflates. However, a key result in Corsetti and Pesenti (1998) , henceforth CP, is that the source of expansionary monetary policy does indeed matter: in their model expansionary Home monetary policy increases Foreign welfare and has an ambiguous effect on Home welfare.
The results of the two papers are somewhat difficult to compare, as the models differ in important ways: due to differences in utility functions and consumption indices, monetary policy is neutral in the long run in CP, but not in OR. The key to the non-neutrality of money is current account transfers and their concomitant international redistribution of wealth. In the CP model, due to a Cobb-Douglas consumption index (and, hence, perfectly competitive goods markets) and the assumption of identical preferences, real income is constant and thus there is no incentive to lend or borrow. Without current account transfers, monetary policy shocks do not affect long-run utility. In contrast, current account imbalances play a prominent role in an OR-type model and, with identical preferences, cross-country differences in long-run utility offset differences in short-run utility.
19 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) , page 648. 20 The relative change in utility due to a pure monetary shock is given by the following:
Is it necessarily the case that allowing for current account imbalances neutralizes the cross-country utility effects of monetary policy? Not at all. OR suggest in a footnote that relaxing the assumption of zero international debt in the initial steady state would make possible differential international utility effects: a monetary expansion would result in increased utility in the debtor country and decreased utility for the creditor. 19 Unfortunately, allowing for non-zero initial international debt means giving up closed-form solutions. As will be shown below, with idiosyncratic tastes the origin of the monetary expansion matters for relative utility.
It is interesting to note that in my model long-run world utility (disregarding liquidity effects) is not affected by monetary shocks. Recall, for any value of ", pure monetary shocks do not affect longrun world consumption and world output. Thus, in the long run monetary policy is a zero-sum game: increases in Home utility are matched by equal decreases in Foreign utility. There are net world effects in the initial (short-run) period, but none in any period thereafter.
When home bias exists, monetary policy has differential utility effects. To see this, we can use the utility functions, equation (T1.1) and its foreign counterpart, to get an expression for the crosscountry change in utility due to changes in consumption and output (again disregarding liquidity effects), and decompose it into short-run (t subscripts) and long-run (overbars) effects:
For any value of "$1, a permanent relative Home monetary expansion increases relative Foreign utility in the short run (due mainly to the sharp decrease in Foreign relative effort) and relative Home utility in the long run. This is qualitatively similar to the result in CP: in the short run a relative Home monetary expansion increases relative Foreign utility. With CP's long-run neutrality, the short-run utility effect is also the overall effect, and thus the story ends.
The OR result that relative utility is unaffected by monetary policy can be reproduced by letting "=1: the short-run and long-run relative utility effects are equal and opposite. When tastes are not identical across countries, short-run and long-run relative utility effects differ in magnitude. If ">1, the decrease in short-run relative utility is less than the long-run increase, thus expansionary Home monetary policy increases Home relative utility. If all individuals in the world favor imported goods ("<1), the decrease in short-run relative utility is greater than the long-run increase and expansionary monetary policy is masochistic.
If " = 1, the above expression reduces to
Thus, if preferences are identical, relative utility is unchanged from a pure monetary shock. It is easy to show that the effect of a relative Home monetary expansion on relative utility is negative if " < 1 and is positive for " > 1.
-16-
The above discussion gives new insight into the welfare effects of monetary policy. In this framework in which utility is gained from consumption but reduced with effort (i.e., output), monetary policy is only 'beggar-thy-neighbor' for utility if home bias is present. With identical preferences, expansionary Home monetary policy helps all countries. If all individuals prefer imported goods, monetary policy is immiserizing as relative utility falls.
III.C. A Permanent Tax-Financed Increase in Home Relative Government Spending
For a unilateral permanent Home government spending shock the MM and GG schedules, shown in Figure 3 , are given by equations (T8.3) and (T8.4), respectively. With home bias, the MM curve shifts even with a pure fiscal shock because the real exchange rate changes. As " increases, the positively-sloped GG curve steepens and, for a given fiscal shock, shifts more, resulting in a larger exchange rate depreciation; see point A in Figure 3 .
Solutions for a fiscal shock are presented in Appendix A, equations (A.11) -(A.18). A Home increase in government spending causes relative Home consumption to fall (A.14), as consumers must finance public spending through increased taxes. Foreign producer/consumers get the benefits, without the associated costs, from the Home fiscal expansion, although the positive spillovers are reduced as home bias increases and more spending remains in the domestic economy. From (A.16) and (A.17), relative Home output rises in both the short and long runs by an amount that increases with ".
With no change in monetary policy, the tax-financed increase in Home government spending causes the nominal exchange rate to depreciate in the short-run (A.11), as consumption-based money demand decreases, and the depreciation increases with home bias. With preset product prices, this exchange rate depreciation is also the deterioration in the short-run terms of trade. As with monetary shocks, from equation (T6.1) short-run real exchange rate changes are smoothed versions of nominal movements, with the real tracking the nominal more closely the larger " is. Also, there is both nominal and real exchange rate overshooting if ">1, and the degree of overshooting increases with ".
The long-run terms of trade (A.13) deteriorates for reasonable parameter values, although by far less than the short-run exchange rate depreciation. However, a combination of a high degree of insularity, near perfect competition, a high discount factor, and a very low elasticity of money demand can result in a small improvement in the long-run terms of trade. From equation (T5.1), the long-run change in the real exchange rate is negatively correlated with % and less volatile than % long-run changes in the terms of trade.
21 In a similar model, Sutherland (1996) uses =9 and =6 for simulations. If =1.6, a fiscal expansion results in a current account surplus if +7> . 22 The money demand equations and consumption Eulers can be used to get an expression for the short-run change in the real interest rate:
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The bias parameter, ", plays an important role in determining the short-run current account balance in the case of a permanent increase in Home government spending. When "=1, Home runs a current account surplus only if 2 + 1 > ,, which is borderline for parameter values taken from the literature. As " increases, however, it becomes increasingly possible for Home to run a current account surplus: only a small portion of the increased spending goes abroad, and this may be outweighed by the expenditure-switching effects of the exchange rate depreciation. 21 This suggests that if U.S. trade negotiators want Japan to reduce its bilateral trade surplus, the best course would be to get Japanese residents to lower their home bias: with high home bias a Japanese fiscal expansion could well exacerbate their surplus.
The real interest rate falls more as the fiscal expansion becomes larger and as real exchange rate overshooting becomes more pronounced.
22 In this intertemporal model without investment, the real interest rate is determined by the path of output available for private consumption, and with sticky prices and demand determined output in the short run, output rises more in the short run than in the long run.
III.D. A Permanent Home Negative Productivity Shock
For an asymmetrical negative productivity shock -an increase in , the disutility of effort -the MM curve remains equation (T8.3), but the GG curve becomes equation (T8.5). The discussion here will focus on the relationship between relative output and the real exchange rate. Stockman (1998) notes that nearly all models of exchange rates, particularly flexible price RBC models with productivity shocks and sticky price models with monetary shocks, predict that the real exchange rate between two countries is positively correlated with their relative output levels. However, there exists nearly no empirical evidence of this correlation, although Stockman is able to find a positive nonlinear relationship.
The model developed here, which in effect encompasses a sticky price RBC model with productivity shocks, gives a possible explanation of the difficulty researchers have had documenting the relationship between real exchange rates and relative output. For the policy shocks discussed in the previous two subsections, the model predicts a positive correlation -just as other models cited by Stockman -in both the short and long runs for all values of $1. This correlation is still predicted to be positive in the long run for productivity shocks, but may not be in the short run, depending on the degree of home bias. To see this note that in the case of a pure productivity shock and >1, equation (T6.2) can be written as toolkits. See McKibbin and Sachs (1991) for a more advanced version of the MF model that incorporates intertemporal dynamics, expectations, and a supply side, using extensions discussed by Branson and Henderson (1985) , Dornbusch (1976) , Frenkel and Razin (1988) and Bruno and Sachs (1985) .
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In the face of a productivity shock, Home relative consumption falls for all values of : with a drop in long-run Home relative output and the concomitant increase in the relative price of Home goods, Home relative consumption must fall. The real exchange rate depreciates for any >1 and, in the short run, Home relative output still increases if the expenditure switching effect of a real depreciation is strong enough to offset the drop in relative consumption. For low degrees of home bias this is the case: in a world in which the source of goods is not important, the switching effect of a real depreciation is very strong and relative output increases. However, as home bias increases, a given real depreciation has less of an effect on relative demand and relative output may well fall.
The above argument has two implications. The difficulty researchers have had finding a positive short-run correlation between the real exchange rate and relative outputs may be due to the prevalence of productivity shocks, sticky prices, and home bias. Even in this case, however, the positive correlation may well be apparent in long-run components.
IV. Mundell-Fleming, Obstfeld-Rogoff and Idiosyncratic Preferences
Frenkel, Razin and Yuen (1996, Chapter 3) presents a two-country MF model that allows for idiosyncratic tastes and has money demand depending on disposable, not total, income. In all other respects it is relatively standard in that it assumes perfect capital mobility, flexible exchange rates, static expectations, and sticky prices. 23 Using this model we can contrast the short-run effects of policy shocks in four models: versions of OR and MF with both identical and idiosyncratic tastes.
Differentiating the goods demand and money demand equations (3.20) -(3.23) in Frenkel, Razin, and Yuen (1996) , with Foreign variables denoted by asterisks, yields: Table 9 contains the comparative static results for two policy experiments -a Home monetary expansion and a balanced-budget Home fiscal expansion -using the same assumptions as in this paper: initially balanced trade, zero initial net foreign assets, and two countries that are mirror images with identical behavioral parameters. The results for both policy shocks are qualitatively quite similar to those presented in the previous section. 
Comparative Statics: Domestic Balanced Budget Fiscal Expansion (dG = dT =1) Table 9 also shows the familiar 'beggar-thy-neighbor' effect for output of a monetary expansion in a two-country MF model. A Home monetary expansion increases Home output through two channels: a drop in the real interest rate and a nominal exchange rate depreciation. Foreign output falls, however, as the expansionary effect of a decreased real interest rate is swamped by the contractionary effect of its exchange rate appreciation. 24 These results are qualitatively no different than the ones obtained in the previous section.
Less familiar results are also apparent in Table 9 . The effects of a balanced-budget Home fiscal expansion in this version of a two-country MF model depend crucially on disposable, not total, income entering the money demand functions. Home output and, by assumption, taxes increase onefor-one with the increase in government spending, so disposable income is unchanged. Since money 25 If money demand depends instead on total income, a balanced-budget fiscal expansion would result in an increase in the real interest rate (as long as the marginal propensity to save is positive), and the exchange rate would adjust to allow Foreign output to increase by the same amount as Home output. 26 However, recall from Section III that the long-run nominal exchange rate response to a money supply shock does decrease as home bias increases (MPI decreases).
-20-demand depends on disposable income, it too is unchanged and the real interest rate remains constant; thus Foreign output is unaffected. 25 The nominal exchange rate depreciates -contrary to the familiar result from a small-country MF model -to eliminate the excess demand for Foreign goods caused by the increase in Home government imports.
That the basic results from a relatively standard two-country MF model -which, in some version, has been used by international economists for three decades -and an optimizing-agent model are so similar should be comforting to practitioners and policymakers. The models do, however, differ in the details, in particular concerning the role of home bias. As shown in Section III, in my model the magnitudes of most variables depend on the degree of home bias. However, in the two-country MF model only the exchange rate depends on the marginal propensity to import (MPI), and, in direct contrast to my model, it exhibits greater swings the higher is the MPI.
26 Which model makes predictions that are more consistent with observed behavior is an empirical matter. Regardless, what has been shown here is important: a dynamic optimizing model with idiosyncratic tastes makes predictions that are, in a broad sense, similar to those of the workhorse model of open-economy macroeconomics.
V. Conclusions
This paper takes a significant step towards reconciling the optimizing framework with the policy conclusions of the two-country Mundell-Fleming model by introducing idiosyncratic tastes, or a home bias in consumption. A simple dynamic optimizing model is presented that not only broadly replicates the policy conclusions of MF, but also makes plausible predictions about exchange rate behavior. That the model is broadly consistent with MF is reassuring, but should not inspire complacency. The details, especially concerning the effects of home bias, are quite different in the two types of models.
Home bias has important implications for the effects of policy shocks. In a world with home bias, the international leakages of expansionary fiscal policy are reduced if not reversed, and a fiscal expansion could well lead to an improvement in the current account balance. Also, when home bias exists a change in the composition of world money supply has short-run net world real effects on world consumption, world output and the world real interest rate. Moreover, the effects of a monetary shock on relative utility depend crucially on the degree of home bias: only if individuals have a greater preference for domestic goods will a monetary expansion result in increased relative utility.
The model with idiosyncratic preferences has a number of implications for exchange rate determination. Not surprisingly, in a model with sticky prices and different consumption baskets across countries, there are short-term deviations from PPP. However, the model is also consistent with an aspect of exchange rate behavior that has been particularly puzzling to economists, the persistence of deviations from PPP. As argued in Krugman (1990) , if preferences are idiosyncratic wealth transfers affect the real exchange rate. In my model any asymmetric shock results in a current account imbalance and, hence, long-run wealth transfers and persistent deviations from PPP. Also, idiosyncratic tastes result in increased the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates and greater Dornbusch (1976) type overshooting. In this light it is not surprising that for decades economists have failed to find much evidence of PPP using U.S. dollar exchange rates, as even today the U.S. economy is relatively closed.
The model is decidedly simple in a number of respects. The absence of investment and the simplicity of the supply process preclude the model from replicating observed patterns in output. Price dynamics would have to be considerably richer if one were to bring the model to the data. A comparison with bond-financed fiscal expansions in the MF model could be made if money demand were allowed to depend on total, not disposable, income, as it would if real balances were in the production function. The assumption of mirror-image countries could be relaxed if one were content with numerical solutions; the author is presently working on an n-country version of the model, to be solved numerically in GAUSS, in which country sizes and bias parameters are not constrained to be identical.
A natural extension of the two-country model developed here is to allow monetary policy to react endogenously to changes in the economy. Along the lines of Henderson and McKibbin (1993) , various monetary policy rules can be ranked according to their ability to stabilize the economy in the face of asymmetric and symmetric productivity and fiscal shocks. Strategic interactions between policymakers can also be investigated, as in McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) . Preliminary work on these issues has been done by the author and will be reported shortly. Finally, the model can be used as a basis for empirical work. Recall, the model predicts that greater home bias results in a higher correlation between real and nominal exchange rates and larger, persistent deviations from PPP. Preliminary work by the author confirms the latter in a post-1973 sample of twenty industrial countries, with a measure of bilateral trade proxying for home bias. 
